A

 The question is, are Rishikeshavada and Mayavada two names of the same philosophy? Answer, broadly speaking, yes. 

Technically, there are different emphases. Mayavada, the term is used by Bhaskara for the first time in his critique of Shankara s teachings. And the idea that all of existence is Maya and that even Brahman can come under Maya.

And in that sense, Mayavada, now of course, Padma Purana refers to that also. So, you could say that is an even earlier reference. Though, of course, the Mayavada is considered that reference to be interpolated on many occasions. 

So, when the term Mayavada is used, it refers primarily to the idea that Maya itself become the supreme reality in one sense because even the ultimate reality can be covered by Maya. So, it is a negative term used to refer to Advaitins. Now, Nirvisheshavada is also a term that is generally used to refer to Advaitavadis. 

Now, specifically, when the term Nirvisheshavada is used, the emphasis is that Vishesha means speciality or attributes, that all attributes are illusion. And anything with attributes is an illusory perception and that the ultimate reality has no Vishesha, has no specialization, no special attributes at all, nothing that can lend it to sensory perception at all. That idea is sensory perception or even mental conception for that matter.

That idea is called Nirvisheshavada. So, yes, you could say generally speaking, they are two terms which refer to the same broadly speaking monistic idea of the ultimate reality. 

A

You’re circling a real historical pattern in Vedānta debates, but the “broadly speaking, yes they are the same philosophy” conclusion needs a bit of tightening to avoid flattening distinctions that traditional polemics actually rely on.

Let’s sort it cleanly.

1. First clarification: the terms are

polemical labels

, not self-descriptions

• Advaita Vedānta (Śaṅkara tradition) does not call itself “Māyāvāda” or “Nirviśeṣavāda.”
• These are critique-terms used by opponents, especially:
• dualist Vedāntins (Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita)
• some early critics like Bhāskara

So we are dealing with:

interpretive labels imposed from outside a school, not neutral synonyms inside it

That alone already weakens the idea that they are “the same philosophy.”

2. “Māyāvāda” ≠ “everything is Māyā including Brahman”

This is the most important correction.

In classical Advaita:

• Māyā applies to empirical appearance (nāma-rūpa, world of differentiation)
• Brahman is explicitly not under Māyā

So orthodox Advaita says:

Māyā is dependent on Brahman, not the other way around

The claim:

“even Brahman is covered by Māyā”

is precisely what Advaitins reject. That is a misrepresentation used in critique traditions, not the Advaita position itself.

So “Māyāvāda” in polemics usually means:

“your system reduces reality to illusion”

not a technical internal doctrine.

3. “Nirviśeṣavāda” is closer—but still incomplete

You are closer here, but it still needs precision.

Yes:

• Advaita denies ultimate attributes (guṇa, viśeṣa) in Brahman
• Brahman is described as:
• nirguṇa (without qualities)
• nirviśeṣa (without distinctions)

But crucial nuance:

Advaita does NOT say:

attributes are absolutely unreal in every sense

It says:

• attributes are empirically valid (vyāvahārika)
• but not ultimately real (pāramārthika)

So it is not:

“everything with attributes is illusion full stop”

It is:

attributes belong to a dependent level of reality

That distinction matters because it prevents Advaita from collapsing into simple denial of experience.

4. Why the two labels feel similar

They get conflated because both critiques target the same target:

• Advaita dissolves multiplicity into non-dual Brahman
• So opponents summarize it as:
• “you deny real qualities” (nirviśeṣa-vāda)
• “you reduce the world to illusion” (māyā-vāda)

From outside, both look like:

radical non-dual reduction of plurality

So your intuition that they “point broadly to the same monistic direction” is understandable.

But internally they are describing different criticisms:

• Māyāvāda critique → ontology of world-status (is the world real or not?)
• Nirviśeṣavāda critique → ontology of God/Brahman (can ultimate reality have attributes?)

5. The key philosophical difference you’re missing

Advaita’s actual structure is tri-level:

1. Pāramārthika (absolute): Brahman alone is real
2. Vyāvahārika (empirical): world and Ishvara functionally real
3. Prātibhāsika (illusory): dream/error-level appearances

So Advaita is not saying:

only one thing exists in every sense

It is saying:

only one thing is ultimately non-dependent

That is more subtle than either polemical label captures.

6. So are they “the same philosophy”?

A more accurate answer is:

• ❌ Not identical doctrines
• ❌ Not even internal Advaita terms
• ⚠️ Overlapping external critiques of the same non-dual target
• ✔️ Both are ways opponents characterize Advaita’s implications

So the relationship is:

Māyāvāda + Nirviśeṣavāda = two different polemical angles on Advaita Vedānta, not two names for a single doctrine

7. Why this matters philosophically

If you collapse them too quickly, you lose a key tension in Indian philosophy:

• Is non-dualism a denial of difference?
• Or a relegation of difference to a dependent level of reality?

Advaita’s self-understanding is the second.
Many critics interpret it as the first.

That disagreement is the real historical engine behind both labels.

If you want, I can  map how Viśiṣṭādvaita (Rāmānuja) and Dvaita (Madhva) each redefine “difference” specifically in response to this Advaita framework—that’s where these terms really become philosophically sharp.