A

The universe exists even at the time of dreamless sleep

An enquirer may be supposed to have the foUo\ving conception. It is common to the experience ofevel}'One that the objects of the \vaking realm are not perceived in dream and that there is no experience \vhatever of objects in dreamless sleep. But this is not enough to demonstrate that the Self is void of the \vorld of plurality. For \vhen they have \voken from sleep everyone perceives the world as it \vas before. It does not occur to anyone to entertain such doubts as -Is this the house in which I \vent to sleep last night, or is it another?' And in one~s dealings \\ith other people disagreements never arise about whether objects perceived in waking before going to sleep belong t6 that same realm of waking. For when one person goes to sleep it does not mean that everyone goes to sleep, so that the world is not for that time annihilated And if it really was the case that the whole world was abolished in dreamless sleep, how could you explain how the world was regularly perceived again on waking? You cannot imagine that a whole new world springs up entirely afresh every time you wake up. For the production of the

pnmously non-existent (i.e. creation from nothing) cannot be accepted,. as it contradicts all authoritative means ofknowledge. And one cannot ignore recognition associated with a feeling ofcertainWin the form of 'Verily, this is that same', unless there is some evidently contradictory factor. So the enquirer will say initially that it does not seem sensible to say that the \vorld does not exist in dreamless sleep.